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How can artificial life (AL) advance scientific understanding? Is AL best seen as a new
discipline, or as a collection of novel computational methods that can be applied to old
problems? And given that the products of AL research range from abstract existence
proofs to working robots to detailed simulation models, are there standards of quality
or usefulness that can be applied across the whole field? On September 16th, 1999 in
Lausanne, Switzerland, a debate on these questions was held as part of the Fifth Euro-
pean Conference on Artificial Life. As the organizers, we wanted to foster a constructive
discussion regarding the scientific status, and future, of AL. We were well aware that
some of these issues had been raised before (e.g., Miller [2]) but we felt that earlier treat-
ments had perhaps not reached a wide enough audience. The format for the debate
consisted of contributions from invited panelists followed by an open discussion. The
panelists were Chris Langton, Mark Bedau, Simon Kirby, and Inman Harvey—Hiroaki
Kitano was scheduled to participate but regrettably could not attend the conference.
We started by sketching a continuum of approaches to AL as science. At one extreme,
there are researchers who use techniques such as genetic algorithms and animat-style
simulations to look at existing problems. Typically the problems come from within
biology. The work of Kitano and colleagues [1] on morphogenesis in Drosophila is
one example. We see this work as exemplifying the idea of AL as a method, or a
collection of methods, that could (at least in theory) be put to use by investigators in
many different fields. At the other extreme is the view that AL opens up whole new
ways of thinking; that it is a discipline in itself. An example of this is Ray’s [3] work on
Tierra, that Ray and some other commentators have taken to raise fundamental issues
about what it means to call a system alive.
If the existence of the continuum is granted, two questions are raised. First, are all
of the possible positions along it tenable? The skeptic might ask whether computer
simulations of the kind developed by AL researchers ever add anything to existing
formal methods in a discipline like biology. At the opposite end of the spectrum,
one might be cynical about the possibility of objectively studying “life as it could be.”
The second question concerns quality: How can we distinguish good work from bad?
The two questions are not independent: If one sees AL research as some kind of
thought experiment, one’s quality criteria may well differ from those of someone who
is interested in more-or-less precise models of real-world systems.
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These were the terms within which we framed the debate. We then encouraged each
panelist to present his own views on the field, and requested that the audience return
to questions about the scope of AL and the problem of quality in the open discussion.
Chris Langton (The Swarm Corporation) began by offering definitions of terms
such as “method,” “discipline,” and “tool” that had been used in the debate abstract.1
He argued that methods and disciplines typically overlap, and thus deciding whether
AL is one or the other is a moot point. The key question is whether or not there exist
research topics unique to AL. Langton answered this in the affirmative: AL’s unique
content is the study of synthesis. He noted that synthetic methods had originated with
the pioneers of computing (Turing and von Neumann) but had not been taken up
until many years later. Synthesis allows the investigator to go beyond the phenomena
that happen to exist in Nature, and to create new phenomena. Langton argued that
theoretical biology, for example, should be about the organisms and ecosystems that
might evolve if we could “replay the tape.” Thus AL gives us access to the possible as
well as the actual, allowing us to discover laws of greater generality.
Mark Bedau (Department of Philosophy, Reed College, Oregon) described his in-
terest in the fundamental properties of living systems. He argued that one profitable
use of AL techniques is to allow us to find the simplest system capable of reproducing
some key property of life, such as hierarchical emergence or unbounded complexity.
Discovering such a minimal system would have obvious benefits for our understand-
ing of the property in question. Bedau felt that AL, in this mode at least, deals in
computational thought experiments rather than realistic simulations. He claimed that
the way to keep these models grounded in reality is to develop operational metrics
for the phenomena of interest, and, using these metrics, to compare artificial systems
to their natural analogues. Bedau concluded by noting that the long-run success of
his approach is an empirical question that turns on facts about how the universe is
organized: Will simple general principles allow us to explain many natural systems, or
is the devil in the details?
Simon Kirby (Department of Linguistics, University of Edinburgh) pointed out that,
although the majority of extant work in AL is related to biology, the perspective that AL
methods afford can illuminate problems from many fields. Kirby noted that the study of
language has involved explicit but incompatible idealizations about what language is.
For example, Chomsky’s idealization of language as the knowledge of a single speaker
in a homogeneous speech community at a particular point in time contrasts with the
historical idealization of language as a community-wide phenomenon subject to static
laws of change. Kirby expressed the hope that the special perspective provided by AL
might unify these competing idealizations by modeling explicitly how local interactions
can give rise to global phenomena. In this way AL can throw new light on disciplines
outside biology.
Inman Harvey (Centre for Computational Neuroscience and Robotics, University
of Sussex) expressed the opinion that AL is not a discipline in itself, nor should it be.
He pointed out that crossover between disciplines leading to “flaky speculations and
hot air” may be one of the great benefits of AL as a movement. Harvey cautioned that
AL should not expect overnight acceptance by other sciences. He mentioned the series
of workshops entitled “Towards a Theoretical Biology” organized by C. H. Waddington
in the late 1960s—today, the contents of these workshops would be recognized as AL,
tackling the same topics, although without the aid of powerful computers. It has taken
time for the methods and questions of theoretical biology to become an accepted part
of biology. Similarly, we can expect that it will take a period of decades before the
1 For the original abstract and other materials associated with the debate, refer to http://www-abc.mpib-berlin.mpg.de/users/
noble/ECALDebate/.
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methods and questions of contemporary AL will be widely accepted. The best way
to encourage this acceptance is to work directly with biologists. Harvey concluded
by stressing that, while pursuing this goal, AL researchers should continue to explore
crossover between disciplines and generate the “flaky stuff” that such interdisciplinary
interaction often results in.
Several themes were touched upon in the ensuing open discussion. Pleasingly one
of these was the question of how to judge whether AL research was of high quality.
Three clear types of answer were put forward.
Mark Bedau expanded on his argument that well-defined operational metrics, sen-
sitive to the phenomena claimed to be central to AL, must be constructed. He gave
the example of open-ended evolution. How are we to measure the potential for open-
ended evolution in an artificial system such as Tierra? How are we to compare this
measure to that of a natural system such as the fossil record? Once a metric is es-
tablished, researchers will be in a position to assess the ability of models to account
for naturally observed phenomena and to construct the simplest model possible that
exhibits these phenomena.
Chris Langton raised the notion of a model’s ability to allow new predictions to be
made and subsequently tested in the real world. He gave the example of the power
law distribution of extinction events manifested by coevolutionary models and the
subsequent prediction that natural extinction events should obey a similar law.
Takashi Ikegami (University of Tokyo) suggested that rather than merely providing
predictions of what must be the case in living systems, that is, describing the unifying
features of “life as it could be,” AL research should also attempt to provide negative
hypotheses: “life as it cannot be.” With claims such as these in hand, biologists are in
a position to falsify the AL models that gave rise to them, and hence move AL forward.
Much of the debate focused on whether AL systems were best thought of as models,
experiments, automated thought experiments, intuition pumps, or conceptual frame-
works, and what influence this might have on how to design and assess such systems.
Although the field as a whole appears to be far from a consensus on this issue, the
notion that a plurality of approaches is healthy seems widespread. Inman Harvey sug-
gested that the most abstract AL models might be best construed as attempts to build
new calculi, new tools with which to address problems from theoretical biology or
elsewhere.
Issues that remained unresolved, and that are perhaps ripe for further debate, include
how to ensure that the status of an AL system (automated thought experiment vs.
nascent calculus, for instance) is clearly understood and conveyed, and how the status
of an AL system has implications for what conclusions can be legitimately drawn from
the system.
An issue upon which most of the discussants were in agreement concerned the
scope of AL’s subject matter. The panelists and audience agreed with Simon Kirby’s
assertion that AL, like complex systems theory, had a positive contribution to offer to
many disciplines, including philosophy, linguistics, economics, psychology, geography,
archaeology, and even theology.
There was less agreement as to whether there were questions central to AL that
were not also the concern of other disciplines, that is, a core of research topics unique
to AL. Although some contributors saw all AL as ultimately taking place within and
augmenting some established research paradigm, typically theoretical biology, others
saw the potential for AL to reveal unifying principles that were effective across disci-
plines that were otherwise unrelated—thus, AL might reveal fundamental similarities
between economies and ecologies. Other contributors allowed that the development
and assessment of AL tools and techniques might be considered to be central to AL in
much the same way that the development and assessment of statistical tools by statisti-
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cians is to some extent divorced from their application in fields such as psychology or
physics.
Questions of AL’s application in other disciplines immediately raised what was per-
ceived to be a serious problem: How can AL perspectives, models and techniques
come to gain acceptance in these other fields? Titus Brown (Caltech) related that find-
ing collaborators from within relevant research fields may take time, but that such
collaboration can result in work with added credibility. Inman Harvey stressed that
conservative models which only minimally perturb orthodox paradigms may have the
greatest chance of success; whether this is the only way forward is perhaps a topic for
future debate. What appears clear is that AL as a science is seeking ways of interfac-
ing and interacting with other sciences, and that there are interesting and challenging
problems to be faced in the course of this enterprise.
In closing, we would like to raise two issues which emerged from the debate for
further discussion, perhaps in a similar debate at some future AL conference.
First, given that it was generally felt that the success of AL research as science might
be measured by its impact on other disciplines, what do scientists from other disciplines
want from AL? We suspect that these scientists do not just want to be shown examples
of phenomena similar to their own instantiated on computers. They want answers to
questions which they find hard to address with the techniques at their disposal; answers
to questions such as why is human language the only signaling system yet documented
to exhibit recursive, compositional syntax? Why do the extinction events evidenced by
the fossil record exhibit the particular pattern that they do? It would be advantageous
to have a way of dividing such questions into those amenable to an AL approach and
those not so amenable. Must we merely attempt each project and see what happens,
or can we offer principled criteria for the successful application of AL methods?
The second issue poses a related question: What kind of answers can AL research
provide? A typical characterization of AL is as a source of new data points; a way of
widening an empirical database by providing synthetic examples of the natural phe-
nomenon of interest. When augmented by data from AL, a discipline can separate
the regularities which underlie all possible cases of a phenomenon from the idiosyn-
crasies of the particular natural examples we happen to have access to. Many of the
participants at this debate, however, do not see their work as a source of empirical
data. They see it as a source of new ways of thinking, or novel intuitions; as a way of
testing the coherence of theories, or of generating other nonempirical results. Is it time
to forgo the philosophically rather difficult notion that the systems developed by AL
researchers have the same status as the natural phenomena they seek to resemble? We
believe that these artificial systems are more like conventional models, built to clarify
and extend theories of natural phenomena, rather than to augment natural phenomena
with artificial brethren.
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